Russian and Chinese support has been instrumental for the survival of the Syrian regime.

The ongoing military conflict in Syria that has already lasted more than a year, bears much resemblance to the 2011 war in Libya. It began on January 26, 2011 with a self-immolation by a protester (just like in Tunisia), with demands by demonstrators for the release of political prisoners, resignation of Parliament and cabinet, end of emergency law, among others, soon spiralled into an armed conflict.

Like in Libya where demonstrations had barely started when Western military instructors working with rebels were arrested in Benghazi, the conflict in Syria – unlike in Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain, etc where it was truly a people’s movement – soon became a full-blown civil war with the Western media churning out details of how President Bashar al-Assad’s regime is decimating civilians.

Unfortunately for the backers of the Free Syrian Army rebels and their numerous Syrian human rights groups, China and Russia have learnt their lesson from last year’s war in Libya. One year on, the conflict still continues and President Assad, a British-trained doctor who took over from his late father, Hafez al-Assad in 2000, is still in power. In spite of defections from the army, the government still has the advantage of crushing firepower and units of loyal, elite troops.

In the summer of 2011, an opposition government in exile, the Syrian National Council, was formed. But its internal divisions have kept Western and Arab governments from recognising it as such. The opposition remains a fractious collection of political groups, longtime exiles, grass-roots organisers and armed militants who are divided along ideological, ethnic or sectarian lines.

The conflict is also complicated by Syria’s ethnic divisions. The Assads and much of the nation’s elite, especially the military, belong to the Alawite sect, a minority in a mostly Sunni country. The Alawites constitute about 12 percent of the 23 million Syrians. Sunni Muslims, the opposition’s backbone, make up about 75 per cent of the population.

Emboldened by faltering diplomacy and Russia’s pledge to keep supplying weapons, the Assad government in March launched assaults on insurgent strongholds, driving rebels from the cities of Homs and Idlib. Bashar al-Assad's fall is far from inevitable. Past Middle Eastern uprisings have failed more often than succeeded. With the exception of Libya when rebels toppled the incumbent regime only with the aid of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, NATO support, almost all insurgencies have ended in failure.

For now, the Syrian regime’s social base has shrunk but its core support, particularly members of Syria's religious minorities led by Assad's Alawi sect, has remained loyal or neutral. The military has not splintered, with conscripts rather than officers or whole units defecting, and the merchant and middle classes of Aleppo and Damascus have remained quiet. The pillars of Bashar's regime remain in place. Recent historical examples in the region illustrate how difficult it is to unseat a ruling regime without the assistance of Western firepower.